Several months ago I went for
a two-week retreat to a hermitage in the low country highly respected for the
austere, meditative life of its monks. Each day a different group of dàyakas (donors)
comes to the monastery bringing almsfood, often from
remote towns and villages. They arrive the previous evening, prepare an early
breakfast which is sent up to the refectory, and then, in the forenoon, the
monks come down on alms round, walking slowly in single file. After they have
collected their food and gone back up, one monk stays behind to give the
Refuges and Precepts, preach a short sermon, and conduct the dedication of
merit.
One day during my retreat I
noticed some of the male dàyakas behaving rather
oddly near the abbot's quarters. I asked my friend, a German monk, about their
strange behaviour, and the explanation he gave me
sent a mild shock wave through my mind. ßThey were drunk,û he told me. But that
wasn't all. He went on to explain that the only thing unusual about the incident
I had witnessed was that the men had become inebriated rather early in the day.
More typically, he said, they will put on their best behaviour
until the formalities are finished, and only then head
off to the local tavern to celebrate their piety.
This stark revelation aroused
in me both indignation and sorrow. Indignation, at the idea that lay Buddhists
who come to offer alms should flaunt the most basic precepts even in the sacred precincts of a monastery Þ indeed one of the few
in
This ominous trend should
spur earnest followers of the Dhamma to reflect still
more deeply on the foundations of Buddhist morality. For his lay followers the
Buddha has laid down five precepts as the minimal moral observance: abstinence
from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, and the use of
intoxicants. The Buddha did not lay down these precepts arbitrarily or out of
compliance with ancient customs. He laid them down because he understood, with
his unimpeded omniscient knowledge, which lines of conduct lead to our welfare
and happiness and which lead to harm and suffering.
It should be stressed that
the fifth precept is not a pledge merely to abstain from intoxication or from
excessive consumption of liquor. It requires nothing short of total abstinence.
By this rule the Buddha shows that he has understood well the subtle,
pernicious nature of addiction. Alcoholism rarely claims its victims in a
sudden swoop. Usually it sets in gradually, beginning perhaps with the social
icebreaker, the drink among friends, or the cocktail after a hard day's work.
But it does not stop there: slowly it sinks its talons into its victims' hearts
until they are reduced to its helpless prey. For this reason those who are keen
to follow the Buddha's path should stick to the rules as he defined them and
should not set about reinterpreting them to justify their own weakness.
To
dispel any doubt about his reasons for prescribing this precept, the Buddha
includes the explanation in the rule itself: one is to refrain from the use of
intoxicating drinks and drugs because they are the cause of heedlessness (pamàda).
Heedlessness means carelessness, recklessness, disregard
for the boundaries separating right from wrong. It is the opposite of
heedfulness (appamàda),
moral scrupulousness and earnestness based on a keen perception of the dangers
in unwholesome states. Heedfulness is the keynote of the Buddhist path, ßthe way to the Deathless,û running through all three of its stages: morality,
concentration, and wisdom. To indulge in intoxicating drinks is to risk falling
away from each stage of the path. The use of alcohol blunts the sense of shame
and moral dread and thus leads almost inevitably to a breach of the other
precepts. One addicted to liquor will have little hesitation to lie or steal
and will easily be prone to sexual transgression, even to murder; hard
statistics clearly confirm the close correlation between the use of alcohol and
violent crime, not to speak of traffic accidents and occupational hazards.
Alcoholism is also a major contributing factor to family disharmony¥to
quarrels, physical violence, and sexual abuse within the family¥and
a most costly burden on the whole society.
When the use of intoxicants
undermines even the most basic laws of morality, little need be said about its
corrosive influence on the two higher stages of the path. A mind besotted by
drink will lack the alert attentiveness required for meditative training, and
certainly will not be able to make the fine discriminations between wholesome
and unwholesome mental qualities needed in the development of wisdom. The
Buddhist path in its entirety is a discipline of sobriety. It demands the
courage and honesty to take a long, hard, utterly sober look at the sobering
truths about existence. Such courage and honesty will hardly be possible in a
mind that must escape from truth into the glittering but fragile fantasyland
opened up by intoxicants.
It may well be that a mature,
reasonably well-adjusted person can enjoy a few drinks with friends without
turning into a drunkard or a murderous fiend. But there is another factor to
consider: namely, that this life is not the only life we lead. Our stream of
consciousness does not terminate with death but continues on in other forms,
and the form it takes is determined by our habits, propensities, and actions in
this present life. The possibilities of rebirth are boundless, yet the road to
the lower realms is wide and sweet, the road upwards to a higher rebirth and
final deliverance steep and narrow. If we were ordered to walk along a narrow
ledge overlooking a sharp precipice, we certainly would not want to put
ourselves at risk by enjoying a few drinks. We would be too keenly aware that
nothing less than our lives is at stake. If we only
had eyes to see, we would realize that this is a perfect metaphor for the human
condition, as the Buddha himself, the One with Vision, confirms (see SN 56:42).
As human beings we walk along a narrow ledge, and if our moral sense is dulled
and the voice of conscience gagged, we can easily commit an action that will
topple us over the edge, down to the plane of misery, from which it is
extremely difficult to re-emerge.
But it is not for our own
sakes alone, nor even for the wider benefit of our family and friends, that we
should heed the Buddha's injunction to abstain from intoxicants. To do so is
also part of our personal responsibility for preserving the Buddha's Sasana. The Teaching can survive only as long as its
followers uphold it, and in the present day one of the most insidious corruptions
eating away at Buddhism's entrails is the extensive spread of the drinking
habit among its adherents. If we truly want the Dhamma
to endure long, if we wish to keep the path to deliverance open for all the world, then we must remain heedful. If the current
trend continues and more and more Buddhists succumb to the lure of intoxicating
drinks, we can be sure that the Teaching will perish in all but name. At this
very moment of history when its message has become most urgent, the sacred Dhamma of the Buddha will be irreparably lost, drowned out
by the tinkle of glasses and the rounds of merry songs.
Bhikkhu Bodhi
Beyond the Net. On Vesak
of this year ßBeyond the Net,û a comprehensive website on Theravàda
Buddhism was launched in
Nyanaponika Dhamma
Dana Project. This
project, launched in 1994 and named in memory of our founding president, Ven. Nyanaponika Mahathera, was established for the purpose of distributing
copies of BPS publications free of charge to Buddhist centres
and libraries around the world. Under the project we send a copy of all new BPS
book publications to each of the 100 centres on our
master list, and we also send 300Ý350 copies of all new Wheel titles (and
reprints) for free distribution. This project can continue, however, only so
long as donations are received sufficient to meet our expenditures. We
therefore invite the general public, particularly our associate members, to
assist us in this meritorious undertaking. We especially welcome grants to the
BPS under the Last Will, which will give you the assurance that your precious
legacy is being used for the noblest purpose of all, the spread of the Dhamma. Please send donations to the Executive Director,
ear-marked ßNyanaponika Dhamma
Dana Project.û
How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early
Teachings.
Richard F. Gombrich.
This book is a slightly
revised version of the Jordon Lectures in Comparative Religion, which the
author, president of the Pali Text Society, delivered
in 1994. Despite the title, the book does not offer a sequential account of the
origins of Buddhism. Its focus, rather, is on the formation of early Buddhist
doctrine as found in the Pàli Canon. The unifying
thesis of his work, developed in Chapter 1, is his claim that the ideas,
terminology, and didactic techniques of early Buddhism must be understood in
relation to its historical context. Gombrich
emphasizes two kinds of influences to which Buddhism responded in the
formulation of its teachings. One was the philosophical and religious milieu
within which Buddhism arose and against which it had to define itself. The
other was the competing currents of thought that were circulating in the Sangha, which left their impact on the records.
Chapter 2, ßHow, not What: Kamma as a
Reaction to Brahminism,û
explores in finer detail the contrast between the Buddha's Teaching and its
older rival. Gombrich regards the specific doctrinal
differences that separate the two traditions as expressive of a more
fundamental difference in orientation: brahminism
was principally interested in the essences of things, in what things are, while
the Buddha favoured a pragmatic functionalism which
sought to understand how things work. Thus, he points out, when both parties
inquired into the nature of the person and the world, they came to opposite
conclusions. The brahmins
saw both person and world as derived from a single ultimate reality, the One;
the Buddha saw the two as devoid of any substantial core, hence as ultimately
Zero (pp.32Ý33).
Gombrich locates the Buddha's most
radical departure from brahminism
in his decision to make action or kamma, rather than
being, the key to understanding existential reality. He stresses the
revolutionary nature of the Buddha's teaching on kamma,
which he says ßturned the brahmin
ideology upside down and ethicized the universe,û
thus marking ßa turning point in the history of civilisationû (p.51). Nevertheless, Gombrich
carries his comparison between the two systems to an untenable conclusion when
he maintains, through a study of the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13), that the Buddha taught the divine abodes (brahmavihàra) to
be a sufficient means to final liberation (p.62). Such an inference is
undermined by many texts in which the Buddha declares the divine abodes to be
insufficient for attaining Nibbàna, and would also
mean that pa¤¤à,
insight or wisdom, is not a prerequisite for the final goal.
Chapter 3 spans a wide range
of miscellaneous material to show how the Buddha drew upon various non-literal
teaching devices to communicate his doctrine. Here Gombrich
discusses the use of imagery, metaphor, extended simile, allegory, and satire,
which he brings into relation with such subjects as the defilements, Nibbàna, the nàgas, Màra, cosmology, and ideas
on time.
Chapter 4, ßRetracing An Ancient Debate,û is the meatiest in the book, but also the most
controversial. Gombrich envisions a contest being
waged in the early Sangha between monks who advocated
meditation as the most effective means to attain Nibbàna
and those who favoured insight. He also supposes that
the proponents of insight prevailed, so that texts were admitted into the canon
which allowed ßthat Enlightenment can be attained
without meditation, by a process of intellectual analysis (technically known as
pa¤¤à) aloneû (p.96). He
appeals for support to the Susãma Sutta
(SN 12:70), which he reads as implying that enlightenment can be attained
without meditation (pp.125Ý26). But if we turn to the sutta
itself, we would see that all it says is that there exists a class of arahants who do not possess the supernormal powers (abhi¤¤à) or the
formless meditative attainments (àruppa). This position is hardly unique to the Susãma Sutta but is met with
throughout the Pàli Canon. True, the commentary
describes these arahants as ßdry
insight practitioners, without jhàna.û But even this
does not mean that they reach the goal by mere ßintellectual
analysis,û without
meditation. It means, rather, that they have followed the path of bare insight
meditation (suddhavipassanà),
a strenuous system of meditation that involves direct contemplation of mental
and material phenomena with only a minimal base of concentration.
In Chapter 5, ßWho Was Angulimàla?û,
Gombrich takes a fresh look at the popular Buddhist
story of the serial killer whom the Buddha converted to a life of holiness. The
story of Angulimàla has always raised the question
why he engaged in such a gory enterprise. The commentators answer with a
fanciful background narrative, so improbable that any reflective reader must
conclude the original reason for Angulimàla's life of
crime has been irretrievably lost. Not so, says Gombrich,
who thinks he has discovered the reason concealed behind the garbled text of
one of Angulimàla's verses. Gombrich
proposes a few emendations to the verse (MN II 100, Thag
868), which leads him to the conclusion that Angulimàli
was a devotee of Mahesa, a title of the Indian god
Shiva, and that he engaged in his murderous scheme to fulfil a religious vow.
While the changes Gombrich proposes in the verse
would have to be evaluated by one more proficient in Pàli
prosody than myself, I found his solution to the problem ingenious, and taken
on its own merits it seems quite plausible.
How Buddhism Began is a humble and unpretentious work, written with
the openness of a true scholar. Though I cannot agree with all Gombrich's conclusions, I feel that in this book, as in his
earlier work, he has opened up important avenues for future scholarly research
into early Buddhism. Nevertheless, I must remain sceptical
about the scholarly enterprise of stratifying the suttas
and discovering doctrinal tensions in their contents. To my mind, the texts of
the four Nikàyas form a strikingly consistent and
harmonious edifice, and I am confident that the apparent inconsistencies are
not indicative of internal fissuring but of subtle variations of method that
would be clear to those with sufficient insight.
Bhikkhu Bodhi
The Buddha opens the Vatthupama Sutta with the simile
of the cloth, from which he draws out the theme that binds together the
discourse: a mind stained by defilements cannot easily absorb the pure
qualities of the Dhamma and is heading for a lower
rebirth; a mind secluded from the defilements absorbs the qualities of the Dhamma and is heading for a higher rebirth and total release.
In the next expository
section the Buddha enumerates sixteen defilements of mind (cittass'upakkilesa). This list
appears often in the Suttas, and functions as a kind
of mirror which we can use to examine our state of mind. In the An1guttara Nikàya a slightly modified version of the list has been
incorporated into the codas at the end of each chapter, from The Threes to The
Elevens. There it is stated that all the numerical groups of training factors
taught by the Buddha were taught ßfor the direct knowledge,
full understanding, destruction, abandonment, utter destruction, vanishing,
fading away, cessation, giving up, and relinquishmentû
of these defilements. This statement places our list at the very heart of the
Buddhist training and underscores its importance.
To
catch a thief one must know who he is; to expel a defilement one must know its
identity. Thus it is worthwhile for us to briefly examine these sixteen
defilements. Although the sutta itself does not
define them, the Majjhima Commentary (MA) offers
short explanations, and several of the items are also defined in the Vibhaïga (Vibh) of the Abhidhamma Pitaka.
(1) Covetousness and
unrighteous greed (abhijjhà-visamalobha).
MA: ßCovetousness is desire and lust for one's own
belongings; unrighteous greed, for others' belongings. Or the former is desire
and lust for things obtained legally, the latter for things obtained illegally.
But on another interpretation, there is no need to distinguish the two; both
are simply greed, which is always unrighteous. They are one in meaning,
differing merely in the letter.û
(2) Ill will (byàpàda), (3)
anger (kodha),
and (4) malice (upanàha).
These three belong together, being different nuances of hatred (dosa). Ill will
is strong hatred directed towards persons. Anger is a less persistent flare up
of annoyance, irritation, and rage directed towards either persons or inanimate
objects. Malice is chronic aversion, a deep hostility which seeks the
opportunity to inflict harm, ßthe continuity,
successive binding together, strengthening of anger (Vibh).
(5) Denigration (makkha) is
contempt for a person who has helped one in time of difficulty. Instead of
recalling one's benefactor's help with gratitude, one speaks derogatively of
that person and of the favours he bestowed.
(6) Disputatiousness (or
disparaging, paëàsa):
ßthat which is disparaging, being disparaging, the
state of being disparaging, causing dispute, competing, not giving inû (Vibh).
(7) Envy (issà) and (8) avarice (macchariya) form
a pair. Envy is resentment or jealousy of the gain, honour,
and respect won by others; avarice is stinginess, meanness, reluctance to share
one's wealth, privileges, and benefits with others.
(9) Deceit (màyà) and (10)
hypocrisy (sà~nheyya)
also go together. Deceit is the disposition to conceal one's own faults and
shortcomings to prevent others from knowing about them; hypocrisy is pretending
that one possesses virtues that one really lacks.
(11) Obstinacy (thambha) is ßwhat makes a person stiff like a bellows full of air,
stuck up, devoid of humble waysû (MA).
(12) Competitiveness (sàrambha) is the
urge to outdo others in order to establish one's own superiority. While this
need to excel can be wholesome, it becomes a defilement
when tainted by the sense of rivalry.
(13) Conceit (màna) is
self-inflation arisen on account of one's birth, social class, beauty, wealth,
learning, etc. Conceit is distinguished as of three kinds, the conceit ßI am better,û
the conceit ßI am equal,û
and the conceit ßI am inferior.û
(14) Arrogance (atimàna) is
excessive conceit, self-inflation that makes one despise others.
(15) Vanity (mada) is
infatuation with one's youth, health, and vitality, or with wealth, beauty,
learning, and other assets.
(16) Heedlessness (pamàda) ßwrong bodily, verbal and mental action or the succumbing
of consciousness to the five cords of sensual pleasure, or not working
carefully and constantly, being stagnant, relinquishing the tast,
non-development, non-cultivation, non-practising,
heedlessness in the development of good qualitiesû (Vibh).
All these qualities corrupt
the mind and prevent it from shining brightly. Thus they are called ßdefilements of the mind.û